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Abstract 
Previous studies of job creation and job destruction (JCJD) have found that the gross job 
reallocation rate greatly exceeded the net job creation rate even in a narrowly defined 
industry or the same international trade orientation. This paper asks whether multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) reflect different patterns of JCJD compared to domestic firms. We 
distinguish two types of MNEs (i.e., Japanese MNEs and foreign-owned firms) and utilize 
firm-level data in Japan for 1995-2002. We find that the gross job reallocation rate may be 
equal to the net job creation rate once we control for the entry/exit, industry, worker type, 
and multinational status. Multinational status is important in explaining the heterogeneity 
of employment patterns among firms. 
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1. Introduction 
With the rapid expansion of the activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs), the 
employment characteristics of MNEs are clearly important. One of the important concerns 
is the effect of offshore production on domestic employment, which has often been argued 
to be negative. This is because offshore production by an MNE replaces domestic 
production, which shifts its downward-sloping labor demand schedule and so employment 
offered by the MNE declines in the home country. Theoretically, however, the effects of 
offshore production on domestic employment can be both positive and negative at the firm 
level. As Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004, pp. 43–44) suggest, domestic employment 
declines through horizontal foreign direct investment (FDI) but expands through vertical 
FDI. Therefore, if a firm conducts both horizontal and vertical FDI at the same time, the 
effects on employment become ambiguous. The same is true at the aggregate level. Net 
effects are unclear if some firms conduct vertical FDI while others conduct horizontal FDI. 
The final economy-wide outcome is an empirical matter. 
This paper empirically addresses this concern by asking whether MNEs reflect 
different job creation and job destruction (JCJD) patterns as compared to domestic firms. In 
order to answer these questions, we use large-scale firm-level panel data for Japan for 
  11995–2002. Our data consist of firms in manufacturing and wholesale/retail trade industries, 
and the number of firms exceeds 16,000 annually. Note that there are two types of MNEs in 
a country. One is an MNE that has an affiliate in a foreign country and the other is a 
foreign-owned firm that has a parent firm in its home country. These two types of firms do 
not always have the same effects on employment. For instance, the entry of foreign-owned 
firms is mainly through merger and acquisition (M&A), which is a typical mode of entry in 
developed countries.
1 Thus, the job creation by newly entered foreign-owned firms does 
not necessarily mean the creation of new jobs, but it simply means that jobs are reallocated 
from domestic to foreign-owned firms through ownership status change.
2 Our paper thus 
distinguishes the JCJD pattern between Japanese MNEs and foreign-owned firms in Japan. 
The contribution of our paper is twofold. First, we address the multinational aspects 
of JCJD. A study by Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) has investigated JCJD patterns, and 
other studies have investigated the relationship between international trade (e.g., Levinsohn, 
1999) and JCJD and have focused on the multinational status of firms (e.g., Görg and 
Strobl, 2005). However, none of these studies considered the outward aspect of FDI: the 
difference between firms with and without production sites abroad. Recent empirical 
                                                        
1 For more detail, see UNCTAD (2004, pp. 111–114). 
2 The entry of foreign-owned firms in Japan and its possible benefits are becoming issues for policy 
makers in Japan because the inward FDI remains at a low level compared with other OECD countries. 
For more detail, see Fukao and Amano (2004) and Kimura and Kiyota (2006a). 
  2studies in international trade are recognizing that the behavior and performance of MNEs 
are quite different from domestic firms. For instance, Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) 
and Kimura and Kiyota (2006b) found that MNEs were more productive than domestic 
firms. Kiyota and Urata (2005) confirmed that MNEs dominated international trade. These 
studies suggest that the heterogeneity of employment patterns among firms can be also 
explained by their multinational status. Our paper sheds lights on a new aspect of JCJD, 
focusing on the difference between MNEs and domestic firms. 
Studies of JCJD in Japan include Genda (1998) and Higuchi (2001). Our new 
contribution is to update of these studies for the period after 1998 and to extend them in 
several aspects, including the introduction of a multinational aspect. In Japan, job 
destruction by MNEs is a great concern for policy makers in view of the expansion of 
Japanese MNE activities in the 1990s. Figure 1 presents Japan’s unemployment rate from 
1955 to 2005. It clearly indicates that the unemployment rate was historically low until 
1995. Except in 1987, the unemployment rate was less than 3.0 percent from 1955 to 1994. 
The unemployment rate rapidly increased from 3.5 percent in January 1998 to 4.1 percent 
in July 1998. It continued to rise and exceeded 5.0 percent in July 2001. In June 2002, the 
unemployment rate reached 5.5 percent, which was the highest rate in the past 50 years. 
=== Figure 1 === 
  3Several factors have affected the unemployment rate. Among them, offshore 
production by MNEs, especially in East Asia, is believed to be one of the most important.
3 
Rapid economic growth in East and Southeast Asian countries has attracted Japanese FDI 
and, therefore, Japanese MNEs have relocated production plants from Japan to the East and 
Southeast Asian countries such as China. Accordingly, this has caused the “hollowing out” 
of industries, resulting in the decline of employment in Japan. Note that the concern about 
“hollowing out” of industries is not limited to Japan, and has often been discussed in 
several developed countries.
4 Indeed, the employment response to the expansion of MNE 
activities is commonly an important issue in developed countries. 
Why is multinational status important? It is widely recognized that job creation and 
job destruction are quite heterogeneous in the sense that the gross job reallocation rate 
greatly exceeds the net job creation rates even in a narrowly defined industry or the same 
international trade orientation. However, we find quite homogenous JCJD patterns for 
production workers. Once we control for the multinational status as well as entry/exit, 
industry, and worker type, the gross job reallocation rate may be equal to the net job 
creation rates for production workers. This suggests that the multinational status is 
                                                        
3 Fukao and Amano (2004, pp. 80–87) provide a survey on this issue. Cowling and Tomlinson (2000) 
also discuss the negative effects of offshore production by Japanese MNEs on domestic employment in 
the 1990s. 
4 See, for instance, Feinberg and Keane (2001) for the case of Canada, and Barry (2004) for the case of 
Ireland. 
  4important in explaining the heterogeneity of employment patterns among firms. We also 
find that the net negative employment growth is observed only for Japanese MNEs. 
Moreover, the negative growth is attributable not only to rapid job destruction but also to 
slow job creation. This is evidence of the “hollowing out” of industries in Japan. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. The next section discusses the data used 
for the analysis and provides an overview of the employment patterns for Japanese MNEs, 
foreign-owned firms, and domestic firms. Section 3 examines the difference of JCJD 
patterns among Japanese MNEs, foreign-owned firms, and domestic firms. Section 4 
extends the JCDC analysis in various ways. Section 5 summarizes the major findings and 
discusses policy implications. 
2. The Data 
2.1. Source 
We use the micro database of Kigyou Katsudou Kihon Chousa Houkokusho (The 
Results of the Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities) prepared 
annually by the Research and Statistics Department, METI (1994–2002) (hereafter, referred 
to as the METI database). This survey was first conducted in 1991, then in 1994, and 
annually afterwards. The main purpose of the survey is to capture statistically the overall 
picture of Japanese corporate firms in light of their activity diversification, globalization, 
  5and strategies on research and development and information technology. The strength of the 
survey is its sample coverage and reliability of information. The survey includes all firms 
with more than or equal to 50 workers and with capital of more than or equal to 30 million 
yen. 
The survey covers the mining, manufacturing, and service industries, although some 
services industries, such as finance, insurance, and software services, are not included. Our 
study thus can address the issues of outward FDI by manufacturing firms and the inward 
FDI by foreign firms in wholesale/retail trade, which are commonly observed FDI patterns 
in developed countries. The limitation of the survey is that some information on financial 
and institutional features, such as keiretsu, are not available and small firms with less than 
50 workers (or with capital of less than 30 million yen) are excluded. 
From these surveys, we constructed a panel data set for the years from 1995 to 2002. 
We removed firms from our sample if firm age (questionnaire-level year minus 
establishment year), total wages, tangible assets, value-added (sales minus purchases), or 
employment were not positive and responses were incomplete.
5 We focus on manufacturing 
and wholesale and retail industries since the number of firms in other industries is rather 
small. The number of firms exceeds 16,000 annually. 
                                                        
5 In the METI database, employment is defined as the number of regular workers that includes part-time 
workers but excludes day workers. Employment of Japanese affiliates in foreign countries is also 
excluded. 
  6In our study, we classify multinational firms into two categories. One is the foreign-
owned firm, which is defined as a firm with more than 33.3 percent of the equity coming 
from foreign investors. The other is the Japanese MNE, which is defined as a firm with at 
least one production affiliate in a foreign country.
6 All other Japanese firms are classified as 
domestic firms. 
2.2. Employment Growth 
Table 1 presents the employment growth of all firms, Japanese MNEs, foreign-
owned firms, and domestic firms from 1995 to 2002. The employment growth of all firms 
indicates similar patterns to the unemployment rate in Figure 1. The negative employment 
growth is much larger for 1995–1998 than for 1998–2002. This suggests that the recession 
became severe after 1998. Note also that the net employment growth rate is different 
between firm types. Although Japanese MNEs and domestic firms show negative growth, 
foreign-owned firms generally reflect positive growth throughout the period except for 
1995–1996 and 1999–2000. 
=== Table 1 === 
Table 2 indicates employment growth by industry.
7 There are three messages in this 
                                                        
6 If a firm with more than 33.3 percent equity coming from foreign investors has one production affiliate 
in foreign countries, we classify such a firm as foreign-owned. 
7 For the sectoral distribution of the number of MNEs, foreign-owned firms, and domestic firms, see 
  7table. First, although the overall annual average employment growth is negative (–1.3 
percent from 1995 to 2002), there are some differences between manufacturing and 
wholesale/retail trade. While the manufacturing sector shows negative employment growth 
(–3.1 percent for 1995–2002), the wholesale/retail trade sector indicates positive growth 
(1.3 percent for 1995–2002). Positive employment growth is supported by the growth of 
retail trade, indicating 3.6 percent of the annual average growth rate for 1995–2002. Second, 
although manufacturing as a whole indicates negative growth, employment growth rates 
differ between industries. For instance, non-metallic mineral products rapidly decline, 
indicating an annual average growth rate of –5.0 percent for 1995–2002. On the other hand, 
precision machinery declines slowly, with a –0.9 percent average annual growth rate. These 
results imply that the industry category could be one factor explaining the difference in 
employment growth between firms. 
=== Table 2 === 
Finally, and most importantly, the employment change is quite different across firm 
types. While Japanese MNEs and domestic firms show negative employment growth in 
almost all industries, foreign-owned firms show positive employment growth in many 
industries. The remarkable employment growth of foreign-owned firms is confirmed in 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Table A1. The industry code is assigned to each firm in 1994 or the time of entry. 
  8transportation machinery and retail trade, with 20.2 and 21.0 percent annual average growth 
rates, respectively. 
3. Job Creation and Job Destruction (JCJD) 
3.1. Methodology 
This section investigates how patterns of JCJD compare between Japanese MNEs, 
foreign-owned firms, and domestic firms. The analysis of JCJD is particularly useful for 
examining gross job flows, or gross job reallocation. Net job creation, which is defined as 
job creation plus destruction, masks several facts. For instance, when the net job growth is 
negative, the job destruction effects cancel out job creation effects. We thus may 
underestimate the contribution of MNEs to job creation without examining JCJD at the 
same time. 
Several studies, such as Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989) and Davis, 
Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996), have confirmed that gross job reallocation rates are 
substantially larger than net job creation rates, implying that JCJD occurs at the same time 
even in the narrowly defined industry. Levinsohn (1999) extended this analytical 
framework to examine the relationship between international trade orientation and gross job 
reallocation rates, finding that, in Chile, trade liberalization promoted job reallocation in the 
job market. Following Levinsohn (1999), we adopt the analytical framework of Davis, 
  9Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) and apply the framework to examine JCJD by 
multinationals. 
Denote   as the employment of firm i of firm type 
s
it L S s∈  in year t. Firm type is 
classified into three groups: Japanese MNEs JM , foreign-owned firms FF , and domestic 
firms  . Denote the symbol Δ as the first-difference operator from year   to year t. 
Define firm-level growth rate as 
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  103.2. Results 
3.2.1. Basic Facts 
Table 3 presents the JCJD rates of Japanese firms from 1995 to 2002. The net job 
creation rates, which are defined as job creation rates plus job destruction rates, are the 
same as the net employment growth rates presented in Table 2: the net job creation rates of 
Japanese MNEs, foreign-owned firms, and domestic firms are –3.7 percent, 9.4 percent, 
and –0.5 percent, respectively. In Table 3, however, we can identify JCJD through status 
change. 
=== Table 3 === 
Four findings stand out from this table. First, the largest parts of the job creation 
rates of Japanese MNEs and foreign-owned firms are attributable to status change.
8 The job 
creation rates through status change are 1.5 percent for Japanese MNEs, 12.0 percent for 
foreign-owned firms, and 0.6 percent for domestic firms. On the other hand, if we focus on 
newly created jobs (i.e., job creation rate excluding status change), job creation rates by 
Japanese MNEs, foreign-owned firms, and domestic firms are 0.8 percent, 2.9 percent, and 
4.8 percent, respectively. This implies that the job creation through M&A is a source of job 
creation by foreign-owned firms in Japan. 
                                                        
8 The number of firms that change their status is summarized in Table A2. 
  11Second, the largest parts of the job creation rates of domestic firms are attributable 
to entry and exit. The job creation rate and job destruction rates of domestic firms are 5.4 
percent and -5.9 percent, respectively. Among them, entry accounted for 3.1 percentage 
points and exit accounted for -3.5 percentage points. This is because domestic firms are 
small compared with multinational firms. Since the main focus of our paper is JCJD by 
incumbent MNEs, hereafter JCJD excludes those occurring through status change and 
entry/exit, unless otherwise noted. 
Third, compared with job creation rates, job destruction rates are much larger for 
Japanese MNEs and foreign-owned firms. Japanese MNEs show a –2.6 percent job 
destruction rate and a 0.4 percent job creation rate. Similarly, foreign-owned firms show a –
0.9 percent job destruction rate and a 0.7 percent job creation rate. Previous studies of JCJD 
found that there was always job creation and job destruction at the same time even within 
the same international trade orientation or detailed classifications of industry. For instance, 
the difference between gross and net job creation rates is 11.9 percent for Davis and 
Haltiwanger (1992, Table 2), 30.4 percent for Levinsohn (1999, Table 6, exporter), and 17.6 
percent for Görg and Strobl (2005, Table 4b).
9 However, our results indicate that Japanese 
incumbent MNEs do not seem to create and destroy jobs at the same time: while they 
                                                        
9 Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004, p.506) also indicated that the gross job creation rate is about ten times 
higher than the net job creation rate in Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States, and 30 times higher in France. 
  12destrroyed large jobs (–2.6 percent), they created only a small amount of jobs (0.4 percent). 
The difference between gross and net job creation rates is only 0.8 percent. We will discuss 
this issue in more detail in the next section. 
Finally, Japanese MNEs present the smallest contribution to the net job creation rate. 
While the net job creation rate is 0.0 percent for domestic firms and 0.2 percent for foreign-
owned firms, it is –2.2 percent for Japanese MNEs. Note that the difference in job creation 
rates between Japanese MNEs and domestic firms is 1.4 percentage points (|1.8%–0.4%|) 
while that of job destruction rate is 1.2 percentage points (|–1.4%–(–2.6%)|). Negative 
employment growth of Japanese MNEs is therefore attributable to slow job creation as well 
as rapid job destruction, implying that the relocation of production sites by Japanese MNEs 
causes slow job creation as well as rapid job destruction. 
3.2.2. Alternative threshold level 
There may be a concern about the specified threshold level of foreign equity 
ownership. In the baseline analysis, a foreign-owned firm is defined as a firm where more 
than 33.3 percent of the equity is from foreign investors. However, there are several 
Japanese firms that have a large part of the equity owned by foreign investors. For instance, 
the equity share of foreign investors is 48.1 percent for Sony, 48.7 percent for Fujifilm, and 
  1337.9 percent for Nintendo.
10 To check the sensitivity of the threshold level, we redefine a 
foreign-owned firm as a firm where more than 50.0 percent of the equity is from foreign 
investors (majority-owned firms). 
The right hand side of Table 3 indicates the results when we redefine the foreign-
owned firms. The results are generally the same as the results when we define a foreign-
owned firm as the firm with more than 33.3 percent of foreign ownership except for the 
status change of foreign-owned firms. One notable difference is that the effects of status 
change decline when we redefine foreign-owned firms. This implies that status changes 
mainly occurred between 33.3 and 50.0 percent of equity share and thus our results are not 
very sensitive to the threshold level once we exclude the effects of status change. 
4. Discussion 
4.1. Firm size 
There may be concern that the difference in JCJD patterns might be attributable to 
firm size rather than the multinational status of firms. To examine this, we examine the 
JCJD rates for large, medium-sized, and small-sized firms, respectively. The large firm is 
defined as a firm with more than 1,000 workers. The small-sized firm is a firm with less 
than 300 workers. Other firms are defined as medium-sized firms.
11
                                                        
10 Nikkei Newspaper, June 28, 2005. (In Japanese.) 
11 Table A3 summarizes by firm size, the number of Japanese MNEs, foreign-owned firms, domestic 
firms. 
  14Table 4 indicates the JCJD rates, by firm size. Firms that change size are included in 
entry and exit in this table, so that the table does not become complex.
12 Therefore, we just 
focus on the incumbent results. The results indicate that differences in firm size cannot 
explain differences in the JCJD patterns among multinational status since the JCJD rates 
are not very different across firm sizes. For instance, the job creation rate of large Japanese 
MNEs is 0.4 percent while those of medium- and small-sized MNEs are 0.3 percent and 0.4 
percent, respectively. 
=== Table 4 === 
The job destruction by Japanese MNEs and the job creation by domestic firms are 
exceptions. The job destruction rates of large, medium-sized, and small-sized Japanese 
MNEs are –2.6 percent, –1.3 percent, and –1.1 percent, respectively. The job creation rates 
of large, medium-sized, and small-sized domestic firms are 2.4 percent, 0.6 percent, and 0.6 
percent, respectively. There is accordingly a difference in JCJD patterns between large 
firms and small-/medium-sized firms even in the same multinational status. This also 
suggests that the arguments of “hollowing out” of Japanese industries might be based on 
the employment patterns of large Japanese MNEs. 
                                                        
12 For instance, if the firm employment grows from 950 to 1,200 workers, it is included as the exit of a 
medium-sized firm and the entry of a large firm. 
  15Note that firms often change their category (e.g., from a large to a medium-sized 
firms). Firms that change their size are excluded from “incumbents” and included in the 
“entry and exit” category. This means that the definition of the incumbent is slightly 
different from the definition in the previous section. To maintain the consistency of the 
analysis, the following discussion focuses on some aspects other than firm size. 
4.2. Period and industry 
It is often pointed out that the employment patterns might be largely affected by 
periods and industries, which we now examine. 
4.2.1. Difference between 1995-1998 and 1998-2002 
As confirmed in Table 1, the negative employment growth is particularly notable 
after 1998. To determine if there are any differences of employment patterns between 
before and after 1998, we calculate the JCJD rates for 1995-1998 and 1998-2002 separately. 
Table 5 presents the results. Regardless of firm types, the job destruction rates for 
1998–2002 are much larger than those for 1995–1998. The job destruction rate of Japanese 
MNEs is –2.4 percent for 1995–1998 and –3.5 percent for 1998–2002. Similarly, the job 
destruction rates of foreign-owned firms and domestic firms for 1998–2002 are –2.4 
percent and –2.1 percent, respectively, which are larger than those for 1995–1998 (–2.1 
percent for foreign-owned firms and –2.0 percent for domestic firms). This implies that the 
  16severe recession between 1998 and 2002 strongly affected the employment of firms in 
Japan, regardless of the firm type.
13
=== Table 5 === 
4.2.2. Difference across Industries 
Table 2 confirms that there are clear differences in net job growth between 
manufacturing and wholesale/retail trade. To investigate the differences in more detail, we 
calculate JCJD rates for manufacturing and wholesale/retail trade, respectively. 
Table 6 presents the results of JCJD rates in manufacturing and wholesale/retail 
trade for 1995–2002. We can see, first, that the positive net job creation rates in 
wholesale/retail trade for all firms are attributable to the large job creation rate in 
wholesale/retail trade. Table 6 shows that job creation rates in manufacturing and 
wholesale/retail trade are 0.6 percent and 2.4 percent, respectively. On the other hand, the 
differences in job destruction rates are relatively small, being –2.6 percent in manufacturing 
and –1.4 percent in wholesale/retail trade. This implies that the positive employment 
growth rate in wholesale/retail trade is supported by the strong job creation rate. 
                                                        
13 Note that foreign-owned firms show a positive net job creation rate (0.2 percent) for 1995–2002 (sub-
total in Table 3), although they show negative net job creation (i.e., job destruction) rates in two 
subperiods: for 1995–1998 (–1.3 percent) and for 1998–2002 (–1.0 percent). This is caused by status 
change. For instance, suppose that a domestic firm changes its status to a foreign-owned firm between 
1995 and 1998 and destroys jobs between 1998 and 2002. This change is regarded as job destruction by 
foreign-owned incumbent firms for 1998–2002. However, the change is classified as a status change for 
1995–2002. Thus, the results for the overall period are not always the same as those for subperiods. 
  17=== Table 6 === 
Second, in all firm types, job creation rates in manufacturing are smaller than those 
in wholesale/retail trade. For Japanese MNEs, the job creation rate in manufacturing is 0.4 
percent, whereas it is 0.6 percent in wholesale/retail trade. The job creation rate of foreign-
owned firms in manufacturing is 0.6 percent, which is much smaller than the 1.2 percent in 
wholesale/retail trade. Similarly, the job creation rate of domestic firms in wholesale/retail 
trade is 2.6 percent, which is three times as much as the job creation rate of domestic firms 
in manufacturing (0.8 percent). 
Third, job destruction rates are much larger in terms of absolute values in 
wholesale/retail trade than in manufacturing for Japanese MNEs and domestic firms and 
vice versa for foreign-owned firms. The job destruction rate of Japanese MNEs is –2.7 
percent in manufacturing and –2.1 percent in wholesale/retail trade. Similarly, the job 
destruction rate of domestic firms is –1.8 percent, which is –0.7 percent points larger than 
the job destruction rate in wholesale/retail trade (–1.1 percent). On the other hand, the job 
destruction rate of foreign-owned firms is –0.8 percent in manufacturing and –1.2 percent 
in wholesale/retail trade. Job destruction in manufacturing, therefore, is much more severe 
in Japanese firms (Japanese MNEs and domestic firms) than in foreign-owned firms. 
Table 7 shows the JCJD rates by industry in manufacturing. The total net job 
  18creation rates in Table 7 correspond to the sectoral employment growth in Table 2. The 
results suggest that the industry-specific factor might play an important role in the 
employment patterns of firms because the JCJD rates are different across sectors even in 
the same multinational status. For instance, Japanese MNEs show a –1.0 percent job 
destruction rate in transportation machinery while there is a –4.0 percent rate in iron, steel, 
and metal. Note, however, that even for the same industry, multinational status can explain 
some of the difference of employment across firms. In iron steel, and metal products, the 
job destruction rate of Japanese MNEs is –4.0 percent, of which is significantly higher than 
that of foreign-owned firms (0.0 percent). This suggests that both multinational status and 
industry are important factors in explaining the employment patterns of firms. 
=== Table 7 === 
4.3. Difference between production and nonproduction workers 
An important policy question is whether MNEs destroy production workers’ jobs 
more rapidly than nonproduction workers’ jobs. The job destruction by MNEs in the 
manufacturing sector affects production workers more than the rest of the labor force. This 
is because the shift of production sites from Japan to foreign countries may cause a stronger 
decline in demand for production workers than for other workers. The analyses above 
cannot answer this question, although it is of great concern to policy makers. We thus 
  19further decompose JCJD in manufacturing firms into production and nonproduction 
workers, and examine the differences between firm types. 
=== Table 8 === 
Table 8 presents the results of JCJD rates for production workers and nonproduction 
workers from 1995 to 2002. We can see, first, that net job destruction in production workers 
is confirmed in all types of firms, with Japanese MNEs showing higher job net destruction 
rate than domestic firms. The net growth in employment of production workers is –3.4 
percent for MNEs, –1.5 percent for foreign-owned firms, and –1.1 percent for domestic 
firms. The clearly indicates that MNEs destroy production workers’ jobs vis-à-vis foreign-
owned firms and domestic firms. It is also notable that foreign-owned firms create jobs for 
nonproduction workers as the net job flow rate is positive (0.1 percent). 
Second, the job destruction rate for MNE production workers is much larger than 
that for domestic firms, as the job destruction rate of domestic firms is –2.2 percent 
compared to MNEs of –3.9 percent. As for nonproduction workers, the job destruction rates 
of Japanese MNEs are almost the same as those of domestic firms, being –2.4 percent and –
2.5 percent, respectively. This is further evidence to support the “hollowing out” of 
industries in Japan. 
  204.4. Is Multinational Status Important? 
Thus far, we have found that not only multinational status but also industry and 
worker type (i.e., production or nonproduction workers) are important factors in explaining 
the difference in JCJD patterns among firms. It is then natural to ask how important 
multinational status is when we control for the industry and worker type at the same time.  
Table 9 indicates the JCJD rates of Japanese MNEs and foreign-owned firms for 
production workers by selected manufacturing sectors (iron, steel, and metal products, 
general machinery, electrical machinery, transportation machinery, and other 
manufacturing).
14 The results are striking. Some of the gross job reallocation rates are 
almost the same as the net job reallocation rates. For example, Japanese MNEs in iron, steel, 
and metal products show a 0.4 percentage point difference between gross and net job 
creation rates. The differences are 0.0 percentage point for foreign-owned firms in iron, 
steel, and metal products, electrical machinery, transportation machinery, and other 
manufacturing. Once we control for multinational status as well as entry/exit, industry, and 
worker type, we can confirm quite homogenous JCJD patterns for production workers. This 
has an important implication, namely that a number of studies emphasized the 
heterogeneous patterns of JCJD based on the fact that gross job reallocation rates were 
substantially larger than net job creation rates. However, some of the heterogeneity might 
                                                        
14 The detailed results are presented in Tables A4-A8. 
  21be explained by multinational status. Once we control for the multinational status as well as 
entry/exit, industry, and worker type, we no longer find the substantial difference between 
gross job reallocation and net job creation. 
=== Table 9 === 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we ask whether multinational enterprises (MNEs) reflect different job 
creation and job destruction (JCJD) patterns compared to domestic firms. We distinguish 
two types of MNEs (i.e., Japanese MNEs and foreign-owned firms) and utilize firm-level 
data in Japan between 1995 and 2002. Our major findings are as follows. First, the net 
negative employment growth is observed only for Japanese MNEs. Moreover, the negative 
growth is attributable not only to rapid job destruction but also to slow job creation. Second, 
job creation through M&A is a source of job creation by foreign-owned firms in Japan. 
Third, the job destruction rate is particularly large for Japanese MNEs in manufacturing. 
Finally, once we control for the multinational status as well as entry/exit, industry, and 
worker type, we can confirm quite homogenous JCJD patterns for production workers. This 
suggests that the multinational status is important in explaining the heterogeneity of 
employment patterns among firms. 
Two implications for policy debate can be drawn from our analysis. First, part of 
  22recent rise in the unemployment rate might be attributable to the exit of domestic firms and 
the offshore production by large Japanese MNEs in manufacturing. The relocation of 
production sites by Japanese MNEs may cause slow job creation as well as rapid job 
destruction. Japanese policy makers should therefore recognize the fact that Japan is losing 
location advantage as a production site vis-à-vis other East and Southeast Asian countries. 
It is thus important to discuss what kind of location advantage Japan can offer to MNEs. 
Second, inward FDI promotion policy might have some validity. Foreign-owned 
firms contributed to the creation of jobs in Japan between 1995 and 2002. The foreign-
owned firms created jobs not by new entries but by their M&As. Although they were not 
newly created jobs, we can at least say that the foreign-owned firms helped by propping up 
employment in the 1990s. Similar arguments can be applied to other developed countries 
where FDI through M&A is becoming popular. Fukao and Amano (2004) pointed out that 
Japan still had entry barriers to foreign-owned firms in some industries such as medical 
services. The removal of such barriers thus might attract foreign investors.
15
Our paper suggests various avenues for future research. One important direction is 
to link the information on parent and affiliate firms and identify the relationship between 
the activity (and the destination) of the affiliates and the employment patterns of the parent 
firm in Japan. For instance, the production affiliates in China and in the United States might 
                                                        
15 See, Fukao and Amano (2004, pp. 55-57). 
  23have different effects on the employment of the parent firm. As Eaton, Kortum, and 
Kramarz (2004) argued in their analysis of the differences in export destination by firms, 
different market penetration may cause different firm behaviors, including labor demand. 
It is also important to ask whether our results hold for other countries and to identify 
which factors drive the difference in employment patterns between MNEs and domestic 
firms. For instance, Ono (2006) found that the difference in employment patterns can be 
attributable to institutional constraints. It may also be important to extend our analysis to 
identify why multinational status is not able to explain the heterogeneous JCJD patterns for 
nonproduction workers. 
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  27Figure 1.  Unemployment Rate in Japan, 1955-2005
Note: Unemployment is seasonally adjusted.








































































































5.5% (June 2002)Table 1.  Employment of Japanese Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), Foreign-owned Firms, and Domestic Firms, 1995-2002
All firms Japanese MNEs Foreign-owned firms Domestic firms
Employment Growth (%) Employment Growth (%) Employment Growth (%) Employment Growth (%)
1995 7,782 3,073 161 4,548
1996 7,744 -0.5 3,045 -0.9 148 -8.5 4,552 0.1
1997 7,936 2.4 2,959 -2.9 181 20.2 4,796 5.2
1998 7,860 -1.0 2,872 -3.0 273 40.5 4,715 -1.7
1999 7,690 -2.2 2,712 -5.7 315 14.4 4,662 -1.1
2000 7,603 -1.1 2,705 -0.3 295 -6.6 4,603 -1.3
2001 7,337 -3.6 2,452 -9.8 303 2.5 4,582 -0.5
2002 7,086 -3.5 2,365 -3.6 320 5.5 4,402 -4.0
Notes:
Source: METI database.
Japanese MNE: A firm that has more than one production affiliate in foreign countries.
Foreign-owned firm: A firm where more than 33.3 percent of the equity is owned by foreign investors and
that has more than one production plant in Japan.
Domestic firm: A firm other than Japanese MNE or foreign-owned firm.
The employment growth includes the employment changes through status change.Table 2.  Employment of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), Foreign-owned Firms, and Domestic Firms, by Industry












All industries 7,782 7,860 7,086 0.3 -2.6 -1.3 3,073 2,872 2,365 -2.3 -4.8 -3.7
Manufacturing 4,966 4,728 3,999 -1.6 -4.2 -3.1 2,651 2,466 2,055 -2.4 -4.5 -3.6
Food products and beverages 483 494 437 0.8 -3.1 -1.4 150 141 128 -2.1 -2.5 -2.3
Chemicals 439 409 367 -2.4 -2.7 -2.6 261 247 205 -1.8 -4.7 -3.4
Non-metallic mineral products 168 151 118 -3.5 -6.1 -5.0 88 80 66 -3.4 -4.8 -4.2
Iron, steel, and metal products 510 465 378 -3.1 -5.2 -4.2 267 251 200 -2.0 -5.7 -4.1
General machinery 504 477 412 -1.8 -3.6 -2.9 274 260 252 -1.8 -0.8 -1.2
Electrical machinery 1,158 1,103 900 -1.6 -5.1 -3.6 743 677 538 -3.1 -5.7 -4.6
Transportation machinery 773 743 646 -1.3 -3.5 -2.6 513 472 393 -2.7 -4.6 -3.8
Precision machinery 100 108 94 2.5 -3.5 -0.9 52 57 49 3.3 -3.8 -0.8
Other manufacturing 830 776 646 -2.3 -4.5 -3.6 303 280 225 -2.6 -5.5 -4.2
Wholesale/retail trade 2,816 3,132 3,087 3.5 -0.4 1.3 422 406 310 -1.3 -6.7 -4.4
Wholesale trade 1,255 1,196 1,079 -1.6 -2.6 -2.2 304 293 266 -1.2 -2.4 -1.9
Retail trade 1,561 1,936 2,009 7.1 0.9 3.6 118 114 44 -1.3 -22.2 -13.1












All industries 161 273 320 17.2 4.0 9.4 4,548 4,715 4,402 1.2 -1.7 -0.5
Manufacturing 126 223 251 18.6 2.9 9.5 2,189 2,039 1,693 -2.4 -4.6 -3.6
Food products and beverages 2 2 2 -3.9 1.9 -0.6 331 352 308 2.0 -3.3 -1.0
Chemicals 34 38 58 3.7 10.2 7.3 144 124 104 -5.0 -4.4 -4.6
Non-metallic mineral products 1 1 1 19.5 -12.0 1.6 79 70 52 -4.0 -7.5 -6.0
Iron, steel, and metal products 5 1 2 -43.1 19.1 -10.0 238 213 176 -3.7 -4.7 -4.3
General machinery 23 22 7 -1.7 -25.4 -15.0 207 196 154 -1.8 -6.0 -4.2
Electrical machinery 32 65 68 23.1 1.0 10.4 384 362 294 -2.0 -5.2 -3.8
Transportation machinery 18 82 107 42.3 6.4 20.2 241 189 147 -8.2 -6.2 -7.0
Precision machinery 1 1 1 11.7 3.7 7.0 48 50 43 1.3 -3.3 -1.3
Other manufacturing 10 10 4 0.8 -18.8 -10.4 518 485 417 -2.2 -3.8 -3.1
Wholesale/retail trade 35 50 69 11.6 7.9 9.2 2,359 2,676 2,708 4.2 0.3 2.0
Wholesale trade 31 32 43 0.6 7.3 4.4 920 872 770 -1.8 -3.1 -2.5
Retail trade 4 18 26 42.7 8.9 21.0 1,439 1,804 1,939 7.5 1.8 4.2
Note: See Table 1.
Source: METI database.
Foreign-owned firms Domestic firms
All firms Japanese MNEs
Level (thousands) Annual average growth
rate (%)
Level (thousands) Annual average growth
rate (%)
Level (thousands) Annual average growth
rate (%)
Level (thousands) Annual average growth
rate (%)Table 3.  Job Creation and Job Destruction by MNEs, Foreign-owned Firms, and Domestic Firms, 1995-2002














[A] Entry 2.1% 0.4% 2.3% 3.1% 2.1% 0.4% 3.6% 3.0%
[B] Incumbent 1.4% 0.4% 0.7% 1.8% 1.4% 0.4% 1.1% 1.8%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 3.4% 0.8% 2.9% 4.8% 3.4% 0.8% 4.8% 4.9%
[D] Status change 1.5% 12.0% 0.6% 1.5% 3.8% 0.6%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) 2.3% 14.9% 5.4% 2.3% 8.6% 5.5%
Job destruction
[A] Exit -2.7% -1.3% -1.9% -3.5% -2.7% -1.3% -3.1% -3.5%
[B] Incumbent -2.1% -2.6% -0.9% -1.4% -2.1% -2.8% -1.5% -1.4%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -4.7% -4.0% -2.8% -4.9% -4.7% -4.1% -4.5% -4.9%
[D] Status change -2.1% -2.7% -1.0% -1.2% -2.2% -1.0%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) -6.0% -5.5% -5.9% -5.3% -6.7% -5.9%
Net job creation
[A] Entry and exit -0.6% -0.9% 0.3% -0.4% -0.6% -0.9% 0.6% -0.4%
[B] Incumbent -0.7% -2.2% -0.2% 0.4% -0.7% -2.4% -0.3% 0.4%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -1.3% -3.2% 0.2% 0.0% -1.3% -3.3% 0.2% 0.0%
[D] Status change -0.6% 9.3% -0.4% 0.3% 1.6% -0.4%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) -3.7% 9.4% -0.5% -3.0% 1.9% -0.4%
Gross job reallocation
[A] Entry and exit 4.7% 1.8% 4.2% 6.5% 4.7% 1.7% 6.7% 6.5%
[B] Incumbent 3.4% 3.0% 1.6% 3.2% 3.4% 3.2% 2.6% 3.2%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 8.2% 4.8% 5.7% 9.7% 8.2% 4.9% 9.3% 9.7%
[D] Status change 3.6% 14.7% 1.6% 2.7% 6.1% 1.6%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) 8.3% 20.4% 11.4% 7.6% 15.3% 11.3%
Notes: Baseline results: foreign-owned firm is defined as a firm with more than 33.3 percent of foreign ownership
Alternative threshold level: foreign-owned firm is defined as a firm with more than 50.0 percent of foreign ownership










[A] Entry 2.2% 5.0% 4.5% 0.4% 4.9% 5.2%
[B] Incumbent 1.3% 0.6% 0.7% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 3.5% 5.6% 5.2% 0.8% 5.2% 5.6%
[D] Status change 0.8% 2.7% 5.3%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) 1.6% 7.9% 10.9%
Job destruction
[A] Exit -2.3% -6.0% -5.6% -1.9% -4.0% -4.2%
[B] Incumbent -2.1% -1.2% -1.4% -2.6% -1.3% -1.1%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -4.5% -7.2% -7.0% -4.4% -5.3% -5.3%
[D] Status change -2.0% -1.5% -1.7%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) -4.9% 1.1% 3.9%
Net job creation
[A] Entry and exit -0.1% -1.0% -1.1% -1.5% 1.0% 1.0%
[B] Incumbent -0.9% -0.6% -0.7% -2.2% -1.0% -0.7%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -1.0% -1.6% -1.8% -3.7% -0.1% 0.3%
[D] Status change -1.2% 1.2% 3.6%










[A] Entry 1.9% 7.8% 8.1% 4.8% 5.0% 4.4%
[B] Incumbent 0.4% 0.3% 0.6% 2.4% 0.6% 0.6%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 2.3% 8.0% 8.7% 7.2% 5.6% 5.0%
[D] Status change 13.6% 5.2% 4.3% 1.2% 0.3% 0.1%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) 15.9% 13.2% 13.0% 8.4% 5.9% 5.2%
Job destruction
[A] Exit -1.4% -7.3% -4.8% -3.1% -6.5% -5.7%
[B] Incumbent -0.8% -0.7% -1.1% -0.8% -1.0% -1.3%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -2.2% -8.1% -5.9% -3.9% -7.5% -7.1%
[D] Status change -3.1% -0.4% -0.6% -1.3% -0.8% -0.5%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) 10.6% 4.7% 6.5% 3.1% -2.5% -2.4%
Net job creation
[A] Entry and exit 0.5% 0.4% 3.3% 1.7% -1.6% -1.3%
[B] Incumbent -0.4% -0.5% -0.5% 1.6% -0.4% -0.7%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 0.1% 0.0% 2.8% 3.3% -2.0% -2.0%
[D] Status change 10.5% 4.8% 3.7% -0.2% -0.5% -0.4%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) 26.5% 18.0% 19.5% 11.5% 3.4% 2.8%
Note: See Table 1 for the definition of Japanese MNEs, foreign-owned firms, and domestic firms.
Source: METI database.
All firms Japanese MNEs


















[A] Entry 2.6% 2.0% 0.4% 0.4% 1.5% 2.4% 4.1% 3.0%
[B] Incumbent 2.0% 2.0% 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 1.3% 2.6% 2.5%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 4.6% 4.1% 1.1% 1.2% 2.3% 3.7% 6.7% 5.4%
[D] Status change 2.7% 2.1% 20.3% 8.8% 1.3% 1.2%


















[A] Exit -1.9% -3.7% -0.8% -1.7% -1.5% -2.4% -2.6% -5.0%
[B] Incumbent -2.4% -2.9% -2.4% -3.5% -2.1% -2.4% -2.0% -2.1%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -4.3% -6.7% -3.2% -5.2% -3.6% -4.8% -4.6% -7.2%
[D] Status change -2.8% -2.9% -1.7% -3.8% -2.2% -1.2%


















[A] Entry and exit 0.7% -1.7% -0.4% -1.3% 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% -2.1%
[B] Incumbent -0.4% -0.9% -1.8% -2.8% -1.3% -1.0% 0.6% 0.3%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 0.3% -2.6% -2.2% -4.1% -1.3% -1.0% 2.1% -1.7%
[D] Status change -0.1% -0.8% 18.5% 5.0% -0.9% 0.0%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) -2.3% -4.8% 17.2% 4.0% 1.2% -1.7%
Source: METI database.
All firms Japanese MNEs Foreign-owned
firms




All industry Manufacturing Wholesale &
retail trade
All industry
[A] Entry 1.2% 3.4% 2.1% 0.3% 1.2% 0.4%
[B] Incumbent 0.6% 2.4% 1.4% 0.4% 0.6% 0.4%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 1.8% 5.8% 3.4% 0.6% 1.8% 0.8%
[D] Status change 1.4% 2.0% 1.5%




All industry Manufacturing Wholesale &
retail trade
All industry
[A] Exit -2.3% -3.1% -2.7% -1.3% -1.5% -1.3%
[B] Incumbent -2.6% -1.4% -2.1% -2.7% -2.1% -2.6%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -4.9% -4.5% -4.7% -4.0% -3.7% -4.0%
[D] Status change -1.7% -4.5% -2.1%




All industry Manufacturing Wholesale &
retail trade
All industry
[A] Entry and exit -1.1% 0.2% -0.6% -1.0% -0.3% -0.9%
[B] Incumbent -1.9% 1.1% -0.7% -2.3% -1.5% -2.2%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -3.1% 1.3% -1.3% -3.4% -1.9% -3.2%
[D] Status change -0.3% -2.5% -0.6%




All industry Manufacturing Wholesale &
retail trade
All industry
[A] Entry 1.2% 5.9% 2.3% 2.3% 3.6% 3.1%
[B] Incumbent 0.6% 1.2% 0.7% 0.8% 2.6% 1.8%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 1.8% 7.0% 2.9% 3.0% 6.2% 4.8%
[D] Status change 13.0% 8.2% 12.0% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6%




All industry Manufacturing Wholesale &
retail trade
All industry
[A] Exit -1.3% -4.0% -1.9% -3.7% -3.4% -3.5%
[B] Incumbent -0.8% -1.2% -0.9% -1.8% -1.1% -1.4%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -2.1% -5.2% -2.8% -5.4% -4.5% -4.9%
[D] Status change -3.2% -0.8% -2.7% -1.9% -0.4% -1.0%




All industry Manufacturing Wholesale &
retail trade
All industry
[A] Entry and exit -0.1% 1.9% 0.3% -1.4% 0.3% -0.4%
[B] Incumbent -0.2% -0.1% -0.2% -1.0% 1.5% 0.4%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -0.3% 1.8% 0.2% -2.4% 1.8% 0.0%
[D] Status change 9.8% 7.4% 9.3% -1.3% 0.2% -0.4%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) 9.5% 9.2% 9.4% -3.6% 2.0% -0.5%
Notes: 1) See Table 1 for the definition of Japanese MNEs, foreign-owned firms, and domestic firms.
2) Figures indicate the annual average rate for 1995-2002.
Source: METI database.
All firms Japanese MNEs






















[A] Entry 1.0% 1.0% 1.3% 0.6% 1.6% 0.1% 0.4% 0.3% 0.1% 0.5%
[B] Incumbent 1.1% 0.6% 0.4% 0.6% 1.7% 0.1% 0.6% 0.2% 0.5% 0.4%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 2.2% 1.6% 1.7% 1.2% 3.3% 0.2% 1.0% 0.5% 0.6% 0.8%
[D] Status change 1.2% 2.2% 0.7% 1.6% 1.6%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) 1.4% 3.1% 1.2% 2.2% 2.4%
Job destruction
[A] Exit -2.2% -2.3% -2.1% -1.7% -3.5% -1.0% -1.5% -0.9% -1.2% -2.4%
[B] Incumbent -4.2% -2.2% -3.2% -2.0% -3.3% -4.0% -2.1% -3.7% -1.0% -2.9%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -6.4% -4.5% -5.3% -3.7% -6.8% -5.0% -3.7% -4.6% -2.2% -5.2%
[D] Status change -0.6% -0.7% -1.1% -3.7% -1.3%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) -5.6% -4.4% -5.7% -5.9% -6.6%
Net job creation
[A] Entry and exit -1.1% -1.3% -0.8% -1.1% -1.9% -0.8% -1.1% -0.5% -1.1% -1.9%
[B] Incumbent -3.1% -1.6% -2.8% -1.5% -1.6% -3.9% -1.6% -3.6% -0.5% -2.5%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -4.2% -2.9% -3.6% -2.6% -3.6% -4.7% -2.7% -4.1% -1.6% -4.4%
[D] Status change 0.6% 1.5% -0.4% -2.2% 0.2%






















[A] Entry 7.2% 1.3% 1.9% 0.8% 1.1% 2.0% 1.8% 2.9% 1.7% 2.2%
[B] Incumbent 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8% 0.6% 0.8%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 7.4% 1.4% 1.9% 0.9% 1.1% 2.4% 2.4% 3.7% 2.3% 3.0%
[D] Status change 1.2% 1.4% 10.2% 23.2% 2.6% 0.5% 0.8% 0.4% 0.5% 0.7%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) 8.7% 2.8% 12.2% 24.1% 3.7% 2.9% 3.2% 4.1% 2.8% 3.7%
Job destruction
[A] Exit -0.9% -0.2% -0.4% -0.2% -10.0% -3.6% -3.5% -4.5% -3.3% -4.0%
[B] Incumbent 0.0% -1.0% -0.9% 0.0% -3.3% -2.1% -1.9% -1.9% -1.6% -1.8%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -0.9% -1.2% -1.4% -0.2% -13.3% -5.7% -5.5% -6.5% -4.9% -5.8%
[D] Status change -17.8% -16.7% -0.4% -3.8% -0.9% -1.5% -2.0% -1.5% -4.9% -1.0%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) -18.7% -17.9% -1.8% -4.0% -14.1% -7.1% -7.4% -7.9% -9.8% -6.8%
Net job creation
[A] Entry and exit 6.3% 1.1% 1.4% 0.6% -8.9% -1.6% -1.7% -1.6% -1.5% -1.8%
[B] Incumbent 0.3% -0.9% -0.9% 0.1% -3.3% -1.7% -1.4% -1.2% -1.0% -1.0%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 6.5% 0.2% 0.5% 0.7% -12.2% -3.3% -3.0% -2.7% -2.6% -2.8%
[D] Status change -16.6% -15.2% 9.9% 19.5% 1.7% -1.0% -1.2% -1.0% -4.4% -0.3%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) -10.0% -15.0% 10.4% 20.2% -10.4% -4.3% -4.2% -3.8% -7.0% -3.1%
For notes and source, see Table 4.
All firms Japanese MNEs


















[A] Entry 1.3% 1.0% 0.3% 0.3% 1.8% 0.8% 2.5% 1.9%
[B] Incumbent 2.1% 3.7% 0.5% 1.9% 0.3% 1.2% 1.2% 1.6%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 3.4% 4.8% 0.8% 2.2% 2.1% 2.1% 3.6% 3.6%
[D] Status change 1.3% 1.7% 15.4% 11.1% 0.5% 1.0%


















[A] Exit -2.4% -2.3% -1.3% -1.4% -1.3% -1.4% -3.8% -3.5%
[B] Incumbent -4.8% -4.3% -3.9% -2.4% -1.8% -0.4% -2.2% -2.5%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -7.2% -6.6% -5.2% -3.8% -3.0% -1.8% -6.0% -5.9%
[D] Status change -1.6% -1.8% -3.8% -2.8% -1.8% -2.2%


















[A] Entry and exit -1.1% -1.2% -1.0% -1.1% 0.5% -0.6% -1.3% -1.5%
[B] Incumbent -2.7% -0.6% -3.4% -0.5% -1.5% 0.8% -1.1% -0.8%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -3.8% -1.8% -4.4% -1.6% -1.0% 0.2% -2.4% -2.4%
[D] Status change -0.3% -0.1% 11.6% 8.4% -1.3% -1.2%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) -4.7% -1.7% 10.6% 8.6% -3.7% -3.6%
For notes and source, see Table 4.





















[A] Entry 0.1% 7.2% 0.4% 1.8% 0.3% 4.0% 0.1% 0.8% 0.5% 0.6%
[B] Incumbent 0.2% 0.4% 0.8% 0.5% 0.5% 0.0% 0.5% 0.1% 0.3% 0.0%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 0.3% 7.6% 1.2% 2.3% 0.8% 4.1% 0.6% 0.9% 0.8% 0.6%
[D] Status change 1.2% 0.8% 1.6% 2.1% 0.6% 14.0% 1.6% 22.9% 1.5% 2.8%






















[A] Exit -0.9% -0.8% -1.5% -0.2% -0.9% -0.6% -1.3% -0.3% -2.0% -14.0%
[B] Incumbent -5.3% 0.0% -2.9% -2.3% -5.7% -4.2% -1.5% 0.0% -4.1% -3.0%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -6.3% -0.8% -4.4% -2.6% -6.6% -4.8% -2.8% -0.3% -6.1% -16.9%
[D] Status change -0.5% -18.2% -0.8% -11.0% -1.1% -0.8% -3.6% -4.1% -0.8% -1.5%






















[A] Entry and exit -0.8% 6.4% -1.1% 1.5% -0.6% 3.4% -1.2% 0.5% -1.5% -13.4%
[B] Incumbent -5.1% 0.4% -2.1% -1.8% -5.2% -4.2% -1.0% 0.1% -3.7% -3.0%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -6.0% 6.8% -3.2% -0.3% -5.8% -0.7% -2.2% 0.5% -5.3% -16.3%
[D] Status change 0.7% -17.5% 0.8% -8.9% -0.5% 13.2% -2.0% 18.8% 0.6% 1.3%






















[A] Entry and exit 1.1% 7.9% 1.9% 2.0% 1.2% 4.7% 1.3% 1.1% 2.5% 14.6%
[B] Incumbent 5.5% 0.4% 3.7% 2.8% 6.1% 4.2% 2.1% 0.1% 4.4% 3.0%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 6.6% 8.3% 5.6% 4.8% 7.4% 8.9% 3.4% 1.2% 6.9% 17.5%
[D] Status change 1.7% 19.0% 2.4% 13.1% 1.7% 14.8% 5.2% 27.0% 2.3% 4.3%






















Incumbent 0.4% 0.0% 1.6% 1.0% 1.0% 0.1% 1.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.0%
For notes and source, see Table 4.
Table 9.  Job Creation and Job Destruction pf Production Workers by Japanese MNEs and Foreing-owned Firms
Production workers
Electrical machinery Transportation machinery
Production workers Production workers Production workers Production workers
Iron, steel, and metal products General machinery Other manufacturingTable A1.  Number of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), Foreign-owned Firms, and Domestic Firms, by Industry
Number of firms
1995 1998 2002 1995 1998 2002 1995 1998 2002 1995 1998 2002
All industries 19,130 18,968 16,945 1,811 1,986 1,987 202 312 338 17,117 16,670 14,620
Manufacturing 10,954 10,763 9,666 1,479 1,638 1,655 112 171 185 9,363 8,954 7,826
Food products and beverages 1,209 1,231 1,155 94 101 89 8 10 11 1,107 1,120 1,055
Chemicals 770 758 715 151 163 172 43 57 57 576 538 486
Non-metallic mineral products 539 507 389 49 53 47 3 4 3 487 450 339
Iron, steel, and metal products 1,459 1,412 1,264 169 198 198 5 9 11 1,285 1,205 1,055
General machinery 1,214 1,227 1,114 182 199 221 12 19 19 1,020 1,009 874
Electrical machinery 1,545 1,568 1,447 268 307 303 16 25 36 1,261 1,236 1,108
Transportation machinery 935 925 834 181 202 209 10 17 24 744 706 601
Precision machinery 281 294 294 59 63 65 4 6 8 218 225 221
Other manufacturing 3,002 2,841 2,454 326 352 351 11 24 16 2,665 2,465 2,087
Wholesale/retail trade 8,176 8,205 7,279 332 348 332 90 141 153 7,754 7,716 6,794
Wholesale trade 4,914 4,674 4,040 276 286 281 77 107 126 4,561 4,281 3,633
Retail trade 3,262 3,531 3,239 56 62 51 13 34 27 3,193 3,435 3,161
Share (%, all industries = 100.0)
1995 1998 2002 1995 1998 2002 1995 1998 2002 1995 1998 2002
All industries 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Manufacturing 57.3 56.7 57.0 81.7 82.5 83.3 55.4 54.8 54.7 54.7 53.7 53.5
Food products and beverages 6.3 6.5 6.8 5.2 5.1 4.5 4.0 3.2 3.3 6.5 6.7 7.2
Chemicals 4.0 4.0 4.2 8.3 8.2 8.7 21.3 18.3 16.9 3.4 3.2 3.3
Non-metallic mineral products 2.8 2.7 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.4 1.5 1.3 0.9 2.8 2.7 2.3
Iron, steel, and metal products 7.6 7.4 7.5 9.3 10.0 10.0 2.5 2.9 3.3 7.5 7.2 7.2
General machinery 6.3 6.5 6.6 10.0 10.0 11.1 5.9 6.1 5.6 6.0 6.1 6.0
Electrical machinery 8.1 8.3 8.5 14.8 15.5 15.2 7.9 8.0 10.7 7.4 7.4 7.6
Transportation machinery 4.9 4.9 4.9 10.0 10.2 10.5 5.0 5.4 7.1 4.3 4.2 4.1
Precision machinery 1.5 1.5 1.7 3.3 3.2 3.3 2.0 1.9 2.4 1.3 1.3 1.5
Other manufacturing 15.7 15.0 14.5 18.0 17.7 17.7 5.4 7.7 4.7 15.6 14.8 14.3
Wholesale/retail trade 42.7 43.3 43.0 18.3 17.5 16.7 44.6 45.2 45.3 45.3 46.3 46.5
Wholesale trade 25.7 24.6 23.8 15.2 14.4 14.1 38.1 34.3 37.3 26.6 25.7 24.8
Retail trade 17.1 18.6 19.1 3.1 3.1 2.6 6.4 10.9 8.0 18.7 20.6 21.6
Note: See Table 1.
Source: METI database.
Foreign-owned firms Domestic firms All firms Japanese MNEs
Foreign-owned firms Domestic firms All firms Japanese MNEsTable A2.  Status Change between 1995 and 2002
Number of firms Share (%)
1995 2002 1995 2002
Japanese MNE 1,811 1,987 100.0 100.0
Entry 230 11.6
Status change (in) 556 28.0
Incumbent 1,201 1,201 66.3 60.4
Status change (out) 235 13.0
Exit 375 20.7
Foreign-owned firm 202 338 100.0 100.0
Entry 122 36.1
Status change (in) 108 32.0
Incumbent 108 108 53.5 32.0
Status change (out) 17 8.4
Exit 77 38.1
Domestic firms 17,117 14,620 100.0 100.0
Entry 3,958 27.1
Status change (in) 225 1.5
Incumbent 10,437 10,437 61.0 71.4
Status change (out) 637 3.7
Exit 6,043 35.3Table A3.  Number of Multinational Enterprises (MNEs), Foreign-owned Firms, and Domestic Firms, by Firm Size
Number of firms 1995 1998 2002 1995 1998 2002 1995 1998 2002 1995 1998 2002
All industries
1000- 1,178 1,241 1,119 546 524 437 30 36 48 602 681 634
300-999 3,392 3,434 3,052 578 659 632 53 72 73 2,761 2,703 2,347
50-299 14,560 14,293 12,774 687 803 918 119 204 217 13,754 13,286 11,639
Total 19,130 18,968 16,945 1,811 1,986 1,987 202 312 338 17,117 16,670 14,620
Manufacturing
1000- 740 725 584 468 452 371 23 30 37 249 243 176
300-999 1,946 1,914 1,703 476 541 527 27 34 33 1,443 1,339 1,143
50-299 8,268 8,124 7,379 535 645 757 62 107 115 7,671 7,372 6,507
Total 10,954 10,763 9,666 1,479 1,638 1,655 112 171 185 9,363 8,954 7,826
Wholesale/retail trade
1000- 438 516 535 78 72 66 7 6 11 353 438 458
300-999 1,446 1,520 1,349 102 118 105 26 38 40 1,318 1,364 1,204
50-299 6,292 6,169 5,395 152 158 161 57 97 102 6,083 5,914 5,132
Total 8,176 8,205 7,279 332 348 332 90 141 153 7,754 7,716 6,794
Share (% of total) 1995 1998 2002 1995 1998 2002 1995 1998 2002 1995 1998 2002
All industries
1000- 6.2 6.5 6.6 30.1 26.4 22.0 14.9 11.5 14.2 3.5 4.1 4.3
300-999 17.7 18.1 18.0 31.9 33.2 31.8 26.2 23.1 21.6 16.1 16.2 16.1
50-299 76.1 75.4 75.4 37.9 40.4 46.2 58.9 65.4 64.2 80.4 79.7 79.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Manufacturing
1000- 6.8 6.7 6.0 31.6 27.6 22.4 20.5 17.5 20.0 2.7 2.7 2.2
300-999 17.8 17.8 17.6 32.2 33.0 31.8 24.1 19.9 17.8 15.4 15.0 14.6
50-299 75.5 75.5 76.3 36.2 39.4 45.7 55.4 62.6 62.2 81.9 82.3 83.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Wholesale/retail trade
1000- 5.4 6.3 7.3 23.5 20.7 19.9 7.8 4.3 7.2 4.6 5.7 6.7
300-999 17.7 18.5 18.5 30.7 33.9 31.6 28.9 27.0 26.1 17.0 17.7 17.7
50-299 77.0 75.2 74.1 45.8 45.4 48.5 63.3 68.8 66.7 78.4 76.6 75.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Japanese MNEs Foreign-owned firms Domestic firms All firms

















[A] Entry 1.1% 0.9% 0.1% 0.1% 7.2% 7.2% 2.1% 1.5%
[B] Incumbent 1.2% 3.0% 0.2% 2.5% 0.4% 0.1% 0.7% 1.3%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 2.3% 3.8% 0.3% 2.7% 7.6% 7.3% 2.8% 2.8%
[D] Status change 1.2% 1.2% 0.8% 2.5% 0.3% 0.9%


















[A] Exit -2.1% -2.3% -0.9% -1.0% -0.8% -1.2% -3.6% -3.6%
[B] Incumbent -5.1% -4.0% -5.3% -3.0% 0.0% -0.2% -2.4% -2.8%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -7.2% -6.3% -6.3% -4.0% -0.8% -1.5% -6.0% -6.4%
[D] Status change -0.5% -0.8% -18.2% -16.6% -1.5% -1.3%


















[A] Entry and exit -1.0% -1.4% -0.8% -0.9% 6.4% 5.9% -1.4% -2.1%
[B] Incumbent -3.9% -1.1% -5.1% -0.5% 0.4% -0.1% -1.7% -1.5%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -4.9% -2.5% -6.0% -1.3% 6.8% 5.8% -3.2% -3.6%
[D] Status change 0.7% 0.4% -17.5% -14.1% -1.2% -0.4%


















[A] Entry and exit 3.2% 3.1% 1.1% 1.1% 7.9% 8.4% 5.7% 5.1%
[B] Incumbent 6.3% 7.0% 5.5% 5.5% 0.4% 0.3% 3.2% 4.0%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 9.5% 10.1% 6.6% 6.6% 8.3% 8.7% 8.8% 9.1%
[D] Status change 1.7% 2.1% 19.0% 19.2% 1.9% 2.1%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) 8.2% 8.7% 27.3% 27.9% 10.7% 11.3%
For notes and source, see Table 4.
Table A4.  Job Creation and Job Destruction: Difference between Production and Non-production Workers in Iron, Steel, and Metal Products

















[A] Entry 1.1% 0.9% 0.4% 0.4% 1.8% 0.7% 2.0% 1.6%
[B] Incumbent 2.1% 3.9% 0.8% 1.9% 0.5% 0.7% 0.9% 1.5%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 3.2% 4.7% 1.2% 2.3% 2.3% 1.5% 2.9% 3.0%
[D] Status change 1.6% 3.1% 2.1% 0.7% 0.8% 0.9%


















[A] Exit -2.3% -2.3% -1.5% -1.6% -0.2% -0.1% -3.6% -3.5%
[B] Incumbent -4.2% -4.6% -2.9% -2.6% -2.3% -0.6% -2.5% -2.5%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -6.5% -6.9% -4.4% -4.3% -2.6% -0.7% -6.0% -6.0%
[D] Status change -0.8% -0.6% -11.0% -22.8% -1.9% -2.1%


















[A] Entry and exit -1.2% -1.4% -1.1% -1.2% 1.5% 0.6% -1.6% -1.9%
[B] Incumbent -2.1% -0.7% -2.1% -0.7% -1.8% 0.2% -1.5% -1.0%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -3.3% -2.1% -3.2% -1.9% -0.3% 0.8% -3.1% -3.0%
[D] Status change 0.8% 2.5% -8.9% -22.1% -1.2% -1.1%


















[A] Entry and exit 3.4% 3.2% 1.9% 2.1% 2.0% 0.9% 5.6% 5.1%
[B] Incumbent 6.3% 8.4% 3.7% 4.5% 2.8% 1.3% 3.4% 4.0%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 9.7% 11.6% 5.6% 6.6% 4.8% 2.2% 8.9% 9.1%
[D] Status change 2.4% 3.7% 13.1% 23.5% 2.7% 3.0%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) 7.9% 10.3% 18.0% 25.7% 11.6% 12.1%
For notes and source, see Table 4.
Table A5.  Job Creation and Job Destruction: Difference between Production and Non-production Workers in General Machinery

















[A] Entry 1.4% 1.0% 0.3% 0.4% 4.0% 0.6% 3.1% 2.4%
[B] Incumbent 1.6% 3.7% 0.5% 2.6% 0.0% 1.1% 1.3% 1.8%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 3.0% 4.7% 0.8% 3.1% 4.1% 1.7% 4.4% 4.2%
[D] Status change 0.6% 0.8% 14.0% 8.1% 0.4% 0.5%


















[A] Exit -2.2% -1.8% -0.9% -0.8% -0.6% -0.4% -4.5% -4.6%
[B] Incumbent -5.7% -3.9% -5.7% -2.9% -4.2% -0.1% -2.2% -3.4%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -7.8% -5.7% -6.6% -3.7% -4.8% -0.4% -6.7% -8.0%
[D] Status change -1.1% -1.1% -0.8% -0.1% -1.4% -1.5%


















[A] Entry and exit -0.8% -0.8% -0.6% -0.4% 3.4% 0.3% -1.4% -2.2%
[B] Incumbent -4.0% -0.2% -5.2% -0.2% -4.2% 1.0% -1.0% -1.6%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -4.8% -1.0% -5.8% -0.6% -0.7% 1.3% -2.3% -3.8%
[D] Status change -0.5% -0.3% 13.2% 7.9% -1.0% -1.0%


















[A] Entry and exit 3.6% 2.8% 1.2% 1.2% 4.7% 1.0% 7.6% 7.0%
[B] Incumbent 7.3% 7.6% 6.1% 5.5% 4.2% 1.1% 3.5% 5.2%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 10.8% 10.4% 7.4% 6.7% 8.9% 2.1% 11.1% 12.2%
[D] Status change 1.7% 1.9% 14.8% 8.2% 1.8% 2.0%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) 9.1% 8.7% 23.7% 10.3% 13.0% 14.2%
For notes and source, see Table 4.
Table A6.  Job Creation and Job Destruction: Difference between Production and Non-production Workers in Electrical Machinery

















[A] Entry 0.6% 0.5% 0.1% 0.1% 0.8% 0.8% 1.8% 1.5%
[B] Incumbent 3.5% 5.4% 0.5% 1.8% 0.1% 0.1% 0.9% 1.4%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 4.1% 5.9% 0.6% 1.9% 0.9% 1.0% 2.8% 2.8%
[D] Status change 1.6% 1.4% 22.9% 23.8% 0.4% 0.7%


















[A] Exit -1.8% -1.5% -1.3% -1.0% -0.3% 0.0% -3.2% -3.3%
[B] Incumbent -5.4% -5.9% -1.5% -1.0% 0.0% 0.0% -1.8% -2.8%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -7.1% -7.3% -2.8% -2.1% -0.3% -0.1% -5.1% -6.2%
[D] Status change -3.6% -4.1% -4.1% -3.2% -4.4% -6.3%


















[A] Entry and exit -1.1% -0.9% -1.2% -0.9% 0.5% 0.8% -1.4% -1.9%
[B] Incumbent -1.9% -0.5% -1.0% 0.8% 0.1% 0.1% -0.9% -1.5%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -3.0% -1.4% -2.2% -0.1% 0.5% 0.9% -2.3% -3.3%
[D] Status change -2.0% -2.7% 18.8% 20.6% -4.0% -5.7%


















[A] Entry and exit 2.4% 2.0% 1.3% 1.1% 1.1% 0.9% 5.1% 4.8%
[B] Incumbent 8.9% 11.2% 2.1% 2.8% 0.1% 0.2% 2.8% 4.2%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 11.3% 13.2% 3.4% 4.0% 1.2% 1.0% 7.8% 9.0%
[D] Status change 5.2% 5.5% 27.0% 27.0% 4.8% 7.0%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) 8.6% 9.4% 28.2% 28.0% 12.6% 16.0%
For notes and source, see Table 4.
Table A7.  Job Creation and Job Destruction: Difference between Production and Non-production Workers in Transportation Machinery

















[A] Entry 1.6% 1.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.6% 1.6% 2.2% 2.2%
[B] Incumbent 1.7% 3.4% 0.3% 1.8% 0.0% 0.1% 1.3% 2.0%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 3.3% 4.9% 0.8% 2.2% 0.6% 1.7% 3.5% 4.2%
[D] Status change 1.5% 1.7% 2.8% 2.5% 0.4% 1.3%


















[A] Exit -3.7% -3.2% -2.0% -3.0% -14.0% -6.0% -4.5% -3.3%
[B] Incumbent -4.2% -3.6% -4.1% -2.3% -3.0% -3.7% -2.8% -2.1%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -7.9% -6.9% -6.1% -5.3% -16.9% -9.7% -7.3% -5.4%
[D] Status change -0.8% -2.1% -1.5% -0.3% -1.0% -1.1%


















[A] Entry and exit -2.1% -1.7% -1.5% -2.5% -13.4% -4.4% -2.2% -1.1%
[B] Incumbent -2.5% -0.3% -3.7% -0.5% -3.0% -3.6% -1.5% -0.1%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) -4.6% -1.9% -5.3% -3.1% -16.3% -8.0% -3.8% -1.2%
[D] Status change 0.6% -0.5% 1.3% 2.2% -0.6% 0.3%


















[A] Entry and exit 5.3% 4.8% 2.5% 3.4% 14.6% 7.6% 6.7% 5.5%
[B] Incumbent 5.9% 7.0% 4.4% 4.1% 3.0% 3.7% 4.1% 4.1%
[C] Sub-total (=[A] + [B]) 11.2% 11.8% 6.9% 7.5% 17.5% 11.3% 10.7% 9.6%
[D] Status change 2.3% 3.8% 4.3% 2.7% 1.4% 2.4%
[E] Total (=[C] + [D]) 9.2% 11.3% 21.8% 14.1% 12.1% 12.0%
For notes and source, see Table 4.
Table A8.  Job Creation and Job Destruction: Difference between Production and Non-production Workers in Other Manufacturing
All firms Japanese MNEs Foreign-owned firms Domestic firms